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production function in land and a capital-labour aggregate. Capital
accumulates through capitalist savings, the labour supply is in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elastic at a subsistence wage and all factors may experience factor
augmenting technical progress. The main result is that if the elasticity
of substitution between land and the capital-labour aggregate is less
than one and if the rate of capital augmenting technical progress is
strictly positive, then the rate of prot will fall to zero. The surprise is
that this result holds regardless of the rate of land augmenting technical
progress; that is no amount of technical advance in agriculture can stop
the fall in the rate of prot. The paper also discusses the relation of
this result to the classical and Marxist literature and sets out the path
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1. Introduction
This paper is basically about the falling rate of prot. It develops an
essentially neoclassical growth model with land, labour and capital as
factors of production. Capital accumulates through capitalist savings,
the labour supply is innitely elastic at a subsistence wage and all fac-
tors experience factor augmenting technical progress. The main result
is that, if the elasticity of substitution between land and a capital-
labour aggregate is less than one and if the rate of technical progress
experienced by capital is positive, then the model has no steady state
and, as a consequence, the capital-labour ratio rises toward innity, the
share of capital approaches one and the rate of prot falls toward zero.
This result holds regardless of the speed of technical progress that land
experiences. Surprisingly, technical advance in agriculture can not halt
the fall of the rate of prot.
This introduction discusses two themes: rst, the relation of the
main result to the literature and second, a specic characteristic of the
model. With regard to the rst, it covers the classical and the Marxist
literature and then a particular induced innovation mechanism. With
regard to the second it sets out a way to resolve a problem caused
by the existence of two assets, land and capital, in a model without a
steady state.
With respect to the classical literature, the result of this paper sup-
ports the conclusions, but not the logic, of the classical authors against
those of modern writers. As a bench mark it is convenient to start with
a simplied version of the "corn model" with technical progress in agri-
culture: The production of corn is constant returns to scale in labour
and homogenous land. Capitalists rent land from landlords, paying the
marginal product of land after the harvest has been collected and hire
labor, paying in advance with their accumulated stock of corn. They
save a portion of their prots which becomes zero when the rate of
prot reaches its minimum level. The labor force grows only when the
wage is above subsistence. At at each moment the wage is determined
so that the entire stock of corn is used to pay wages. The classical
model, when stripped of its frills1, corresponds to this corn model. One
1 One of the frills is non-homogenous land and rent. This is important for dis-
tribution but not relevant for the falling rate of prot and the approach to the
stationary state.
c 2005 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
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3of the main conclusions of the classical school is that the equilibrium
of this model will approach a stationary state with the rate of prot
at a minimum, the wage at subsistence and no growth. Now add land
augmenting technical progress. With the intuition of the neoclassical
growth model, one sees that this model has a steady state in which the
rate of prot is above the minimum level, the wage is above subsistence,
and output, labour and the stock of corn grow at the rate of technical
progress2. That is, once land augumenting technical progress is added
to the classical model, its equilibrium does not approach the stationary
state.
In the light of this, consider the positions of David Ricardo and
John Steward Mill on the falling rate of prot and the approach to the
stationary state in the presence of technical progress Ricardo ( 1817 ,
p. 120) stated;
The natural tendency of prots then is to fall; for...the additional
quantity of food required is obtained by the sacrice of more and
more labour. This tendency...is happily checked at repeated inter-
vals by improvements in machinery connected with the production
of necessaries, as well as by discoveries in the science of agricul-
ture...which enable us to lower the price of the prime necessaries
of the labourer. But the rise ...in the wages is, however, limited;
for as soon as wages should be equal...to...the whole receipts of the
farmer, there must be an end to accumulation;...
The common interpretation of this has been that technical progress will
only slow the fall of the rate of prot. For example Eltis (1988, p. 278),
in the New Palgrave, writes of Ricardo that technical progress "...re-
duces the rate at which prots decline, without a¤ecting the proposition
that they must fall eventually to the minimum stationary level." Mill
(1965, p. 743) also considered the same issues. He concluded
All improvements, therefore, in production of almost any com-
modity, tend to widen the interval which has to be passed before
arriving at the stationary state.
Again the common interpretation is as with Ricardo. According to Eltis
(1988, p. 279) "...Mill did not envisage that technical progress...would
be su¢ cient to overcome the inuence of population growth and agri-
cultural diminishing returns so prots would continually fall towards
(the minimum level)". Thus, if one takes the corn model as the basis for
classical thinking, it must be concluded that Ricardo and Mill did not
understand that, if there was any technical progress at all, the economy
would never arrive at the stationary state and the rate of prot and
2 This is conrmed by the work of modern authors cited below
swp0000.tex; 21/09/2005; 14:26; p.3
4the wage would be forever above their minimum levels. This lack of
understanding, to my knowledge, has not been pointed out before.
Now turn to the modern treatments of technical progress in the
context of the classical model: Johansen (1967) and Samuelson (1976).
Both of these authors have the classical labour markets and capitalist
behavior. Their models di¤er mainly in production since both have
neoclassical capital rather than corn as an arguments in their produc-
tion functions. This is important because it allows for the possibility
of capital augmenting technical progress. Specically Johansen has a
Cobb Douglas production function in a capital-labor aggregate and
land and capital augmenting technical progress while Samuelson has
a general neoclassical production function in the same arguments and
land augmenting technical progress. Both authors show that their mod-
els exhibit steady states with the rate of prot above the minimum level,
the wage above subsistence and positive growth. They then state that
their results corroborate those of the classical authors. This gives rise
to two questions; First, how can these results corroborate those of the
classical authors when they are exactly the contrary? and second, how
can these models, which are similar to the present model, have a steady
state with the rate of prot above its minimum level?
In respect to the rst question Johansens justication (p. 21) is that
In the classical writings one can nd some suggestions about tech-
nical progress postponing stagnation, perhaps for an innite fu-
ture.
Samuelson (p. 1416) notes:
Mill went on to emphasize that technical innovation, continued in
the long-run steady state, would imply rising output forever, we
can show on Mills behalf that, if there is land augmenting tech-
nical progress at a steady exponential rate (the above described
stationary state will occur).
No references for these justications are given and, in any case, they
do not hold water. With respect to Johansen, it might be the case that
there are suggestions, but his results contradict the basic beliefs of the
classical economists. The situation is even worse with Samuelson. He
says "On Mills behalf" and then goes on to demonstrate that Mills
understanding of the future was wrong. I think that what happened was
that these authors were more interested in drawing the logical conse-
quences of the classical assumptions rather than engaging in a detailed
analysis of whether the classical economists correctly understood all
the implications of their assumptions.
In respect to the second question, it is certainly true that for general
models of this type the rate of prot will fall to its minimum level. What
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5happened in the two cited cases is that the authors chose accidentally,
and without justication, the two special cases where this does not hap-
pen: Johansen has a unitary elasticity of substitution while Samuelson
has no capital augmenting technical progress.
With respect to the classical literature the contribution of this paper
is two fold: rst it shows that the conclusions of the modern writers are
not correct generally; and second, it shows that, if one takes the model
with neoclassical capital as the basis for classical thinking, then these
authors, although they were unaware of the necessary reasoning, had
accidently reached the generally correct conclusion.
I think that the result has implications beyond the characteristics of
the classical model. It would seem that most economists, if asked why
the rate of prot has not consistently fallen, would point to the rapid
technical progress in agriculture. Eltis (1988, p.280) states
...technical progress has raised productivity enormously in both
industry and agriculture and there has been no tendency for a
rising relative cost of food to squeeze prots in the manner that
Ricardo and Mill expected.
It may be true that the rate of prot has not fallen consistently, but
the result of this paper implies that this can not be attributed to rapid
progress in agriculture and is, thus, rather mysterious.
With regard to the Marxist literature, in the rst place Marxs
central idea is well-known: He thought that capitalism would fall and
be replaced by socialism. He further held that capitalist development
would be characterized by the following "historical tendencies": A rising
capital-labour ratio, a rising share of capital and a falling rate of prot.
In addition he seems to have initially thought that the wage would stay
at subsistence but later changed his mind about this. These tendencies
play important roles in Marxs various theories (never well worked out)
of the end of capitalism3. However the focus of interest has been on
Marxs theory of the falling rate of prot.
Marx thought that, in a temporary fashion, a shortage of labour
could cause the wage to rise and the rate of prot to fall; but that
the long run fall in the rate of prot would be due to rms choos-
ing progressively more capital intensive means of production4. This
3 The phrase "historical tendencies" was coined by Dume´nil and Le´vy (2003).
Their list is slightly longer than the one given above. They emphasize that a constant
share of capital is also consistent with Marxs writing. I have abbreviated the list
and chosen the rising share of capital because these are the tendencies that carry the
weight in Marxs theories of the end of capitalism. See Petith (2002) for a summary
of these theories.
4 Marx explains that the fall in the rate of prot is due to the technical choices
of the rms and "Nothing is more absurd, for this reason, than to explain the fall
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6dichotomy has given rise to two distinct "lines of thought". The rst,
which is loosely connected with the idea of the prot squeeze, attempts
to explain the fall in the rate of prot in industrialized countries that
has taken place since 1973 mainly in terms of rising wages5. The second,
which I will refer to as the technical choice school, attempts to give a
general explanation of a long run fall in the rate of prot when this is
the result of rmstechnical decisions, and not pressure from the labour
market. Although a natural background assumption would seem to be
that of a constant wage, this has been discarded for two reasons: rst,
one can nd some justication for a rising wage in Marxs writings; and
second, Marxs own argument about rmstechnical choices has been
shown by Okishio (1961) to imply a rising wage. Thus the objective
of the technical choice school seems to have become to explain a long
run fall in the rate of prot in terms of the technical choices of rms
where lack of labour market pressure is evidenced by a non-rising labour
share6 .
There are three distinct contributions to this school. First, Skott
(1992) and Michl (1994) use a monopolistic competition setting and a
Kalecki type wage determination to show that the rate of prot will fall
as rms adjust slowly to an optimal capital-labour ratio. Here, since
the models have a steady state, the fall in the rate of prot comes
to an end. Second, Skillman (1997) has a matching and bargaining
model of the labour market where the individual outcomes depend on
economy wide determined outside options. In the presence of capital
using labour saving innovations, rms make technical choices which
are prot maximizing at the old outside options but change these in a
way that the labour share remains constant and the rate of prot falls.
Here there is no natural end to the fall in the rate of prot. Finally
Duménil and Lévy, in a sequence of papers culminating in (2003) have
a model with a steady state in which the share of labour is constant
and the rate of prot falls. The model has an endogenous labour supply,
a link between the rates of growth of employment and the wage, and
an induced innovation mechanism in which the factor shares determine
the rates of change of the input coe¢ cients. Their contributions are
notable because they span the two lines of thought: In (1993, chapter
in the rate of prot by a rise in the rate of wages, although this may be the case by
way of an exception."Marx (1984, p.240). A bit further along, on p.256, he explains
this exception:"...the competitive struggle (among capitalists) is accompanied by a
temporary rise in wages and a resultant further temporary fall in the rate of prot."
5 These writings are surveyed in Howard and King (1992, chapter 16). A recent
contribution which contains a critical survey is Brenner (1998).
6 See Dume´nil and Le´vy (2003, p.206) for a detailed justication of this in terms
of Marxs writings.
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715) they explain the post 1973 fall in the rate of prot in terms of an
early version of the model and, in the latest version, primarily thanks
to the induced innovation mechanism, they manage to generate all of
the historical tendencies.
The present paper belongs to the technical choice school since the
assumption of an innitely elastic labour supply means that labour
market pressure is absent. In this area, its contribution is to show that,
by adding land, the historical tendencies can be generated without
having a rising wage. This is important both for understanding what
causes a falling rate of prot and for the coherence of Marxs overall
view. First one can take the labour market assumption as an extreme
case where there is no pressure on prots from this quarter. This means
that when we observe a falling rate of prot (as in the post 1973 period)
it is perfectly possible that it may have little to do with a rising wage.
Second, the historical tendencies are important, not for themselves, but
because of the roles they played in Marxs various accounts of the end
of capitalism. But these accounts are much weakened if they include a
rising wage. Thus the importance here is that the present paper shows
how the historical tendencies can be generated without, at the same
time, calling into doubt their raison dêtre.
The induced innovation mechanism has a paradoxical relation to the
present paper which can be illustrated by looking at Foley (2003) . Foley
has a model which is very similar to the one of this paper with output
produced by land and a capital-labour aggregate and an elasticity of
substitution less than one. Yet the model converges to a steady state
with a constant positive rate of prot. This seems to contradict the
main result of the present paper; what happened? Foley incorporates
a version of the Duménil-Lévy induced innovation mechanism in his
model. This, in turn, implies that the rate of capital augmenting tech-
nical progress approaches zero7 so that one of the two assumptions of
the present model is violated. The paradox is that, if one wants to
generate the historical tendencies as is done in the present model, one
7 This is a simplication: there are two distinct mechanisms and Foley has two
versions. The rst mechanism is associated with Kenedy (1964) , involves the rates
of factor augmenting technical progress and is set in the context of a Solow growth
model Drandakis and Phelps. (1966) showed that this implies that the rate of capital
augmenting technical progress approaches zero. The Dume´nil-Le´vy mechanism in-
volves rates of change of the input coe¢ cients and is set in the context of a classical
xed coe¢ cient model. In one of Dume´nil and Le´vys cases the change in the capital
input coe¢ cient approaches zero. Foley has a classical and a neoclassical version.
In both of these, if land is not considered a free good but is priced at its marginal
product, then the rate of capital augmenting technical progress or the rate of change
of the capital input coe¢ cient approaches zero and the rate of prot approaches a
positive constant.
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8has to deny the validity of just the induced innovation mechanism that
was responsible for them in the Duménil-Lévy model.
Turning to the second theme, the fact that the model has two assets,
land and capital, and no steady state causes a problem. Since the
capitalists hold both assets, the rate of return must be the same on
both of them and since capital gains are part of the return to land,
this leads to a di¤erential equation in the price of land and the task
of choosing an initial value for the price. This is a problem that one
generally meets in models with more than one asset, the Hahn problem
( Hahn (1966)). The solution is to choose an initial price in such a way
that the model approaches the steady state. The justication of this is
that any other choice will lead to negative prices in nite time ( Shell
and Stiglitz (1967)). In the present paper, this solution does not work
because there is no steady state and all choices of an initial price lead
to a negative price of land. Ones rst reaction is that there must be
something wrong with the model, but since the model is conventional
except that capital augmenting technical progress has been added, it
is more apt to say that the problem does not usually appear because,
with no justication, a special case is chosen. Thus the problem must
be faced.
The solution I have chosen is to assume that the world will end at a
certain terminal date, which may approach innity. Then, for any given
terminal date, one can nd an initial price of land such that the price
of land will be positive until the terminal date. Furthermore one can
x the initial price with the following argument: Since capital and the
good are equivalent, capital can always be consumed and so should have
value at any given moment. But the value of land is that it contributes
to future production. Thus it should have no value at the terminal date
and its price in terms of the good should be zero. This condition xes
the initial price of land.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model.
This generates a single non-autonomous di¤erential equation in the
aggregate-land ratio. The asymptotic form of this equation is solved
and the main result is deduced from this solution. Section 3 provides
an intuitive explanation of the main result. Section 4 describes the
path of the price of land . Finally Section 5 shows that the path
generated by the asymptotic form approaches that generated by the
original di¤erential equation.
swp0000.tex; 21/09/2005; 14:26; p.8
92. Model and Result
There are two factors of production, each measured in e¤ective units:
Land,M Met where the quantity of physical unitsM is set equal to
1,   0 is the rate of land augmenting technical progress and t is time;
and a Cobb-Douglas capital-labour aggregate X  KL1 et, the
where K and L are capital and labor in physical units,  is a constant
0 <  < 1 and   0 is the rate of aggregate augmenting technical
progress8. x  X=M is the aggregate-land ratio in terms of e¤ective
units.
x = KL1 e( )t (1)
There is a single good, output Y is produced by a CES production
function in M and X, Y = [X  + (1  )M ]  1 where 0 <  < 1
is a constant and the elasticity of substitution between M and X is
 = 11+ ; 1    1: Bringing M outside the brackets gives
Y = f(x)Met; f(x)  c1x
(c2 + x)
1

; M = 1 (2)
where c1 = 1=(1   )
1
 and c2 = (c1): f(x) is the ratio of output to
land in e¤ective units which depends on x.
The supply of labour is innitely elastic at the subsistence wage w.
The demand, and thus the quantity of labour, is determined so that
the marginal product of labour is equal to the wage. The marginal
product of the aggregate is f 0(x) (f 0  df=dx) and xet is its quantity
so xf 0(x)et is the payment it receives. Because the aggregate is Cobb-
Douglas, labour receives (1  ) of this payment. Thus
L =
1  
w
xf 0(x)et =
1  
w
c1c2x
(c2 + x)
1+ 1

et: (3)
From (1) and (3)
K = x
1
L
  1 
 e
 

t
= (
1  

c1c2)
  1 

x
(c2 + x)
1

(1 ) e
( )t (4)
where  = 1+(1 ) > 1 if  > 0 and  =

 > 0 if  > 0: Thus L and
K are given as functions of x and t .
Capitalists own both the stock of capital and the land. They receive
the output, pay the wage to the workers and get capital gains on the
8 But since the aggregate is Cobb-Douglas, it can be thought of as capital
augmenting.
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land, _PM; where P is the price of land in physical units and _P  dP=dt.
It is assumed that they save their entire income 9. Thus savings are
Y  wL+ _PM . The change in wealth is _K+ _PM . Setting the two equal
gives
_K = Y   wL (5)
Thus the assumption that capitalists save all eliminates capital gains
and allows the model to be solved without taking the path of the price
of land into account10.
The model reduces to a non-autonomous di¤erential equation in x.
From (1)
x^ = K^ + (1  )L^+     (6)
where x^  _x=x:From (3)
L^ =  +
c2   x
c2 + x
x^: (7)
From (2), (3) and (5), _K is a function of x and t . Dividing this
expression by (4) to get K^ gives
K^ = c
1

1 c
1 

2 (
1  
w
)
1 

x + c2
(x + c2)
1

(1+ 1

)
et (8)
Substituting (7) and (8) into (6) gives
_x = F (x)et +G(x) with x(t0) = Xo > 0 (9)
where
F (x)  a(x
 + c2)
(c2 + x)

 (c2 + x)
x;
G(x)  (  ) c2 + x

c2 + x
x;
a  (c1c
1 )
2 )
1


(
1  
w
)
1 

9 One might object that the saving behavior of capitalists should be determined
by intertemporal optimization. There are two questions: what is the e¤ect of con-
tinued saving on the rate of prot? and what is the e¤ect of the temporal pattern
of the prot rate on saving? This paper only seeks to answer the rst question.
10 If capitalists only saved a proportion of their income, then capital gains on land
would a¤ect the accumulation of capital. In a rough way one can see what the e¤ect
of this would be. Below it is shown that land experiences rst capital gains and then
losses. Equating saving with the change in wealth shows that, although the lower
saving would generally reduce capital accumulation, the early capital gains would
reduce it further while the later capital losses would raise it. If the price of land falls,
I am poorer, consume less and thus accumulate more capital.
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and it is supposed that the initial value of x is positive.
Let x(t) be the continuous solution to (9) 11. Lemma 1 gives some
of its characteristics,
LEMMA 1. For t0  t < 1; x(t) > 0: Let  > 0; there exists t0 such
that _x > 0 for t  t0: Furthermore x!1 as t!1:
Proof. First note that x(t) > 0 for t0  t < 1: Suppose x(t) = 0 for
some nite value of t . Let t be the rst such value. Then x(t)  0;
t0  t  t: This means that F (x)=x and G(x)=x are bounded below on
this domain and there is an A such that
F (x(t))
x(t)
et +
G(x(t))
x(t)
> A; t0  t  t:
so that _x(t) > Ax(t) on this domain. Integrating from t0 to t and using
both sides of the inequality as exponents gives
x(t) > x(t0)ea(t t0) > 0;
contradiction.
From the continuity of x(t), x(t)  0; t0  t  1: Thus there
exists an F > 0 and a G such that F (x(t)) > F and G(x(t)) > G for
t0  t  1: Thus since  > 0 implies  > 0; there exist t0 and a B > 0
such that
F (x(t))et +G(x(t)) > B > 0; t  t0
so that _x(t) > B > 0 for t  t0: This proves the second statement.
Integrating this gives
x(t) > x(t0) +B(t  t0)
which proves the third statement. 
It is instructive to consider what happens to (9) as x ! 1 when
 > 0. Dene ~F (x) and ~G(x) by
F (x) =
a
x 1
~F (x) and G(x) =
  

x ~G(x): (10)
When  > 0 these functions satisfy
lim
x!1
~F (x) = lim
x!1
~G(x) = 1: (11)
Consider the equation that arises when the asymptotic values of these
functions are substituted into (9) :
_x =
aet
x 1
+
  

x; with x(T ) = X: (12)
11 See Petith (2002) for a proof of the existence and uniqueness of x(t) on [t0;1) :
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In order to determine the solution to (12), substitute the function y(t)
for x(t) with y(t) = a e
t
(x(t)) : The function y(t) satises the following
di¤erential equation _y = y(   y) which can be easily integrated,
y(t) = 
1 Ce t : Thus, the solutions of (12) can be determined.
x(t; a; ; T;X) =

a

et(1  C(a; ; T;X)e t)
 1

(13)
in which the constant C(a; ; T;X) is determined by the initial condi-
tion X = x(T ; a; ; T;X) Also the function x(t) can be dened whose
asymptotic behavior is identical to that of x(t) when t tends to innity:
x(t)  (a

et)
1
 : (14)
It would seem likely that the solution to (9), x(t); would tend to x(t)
as t!1. Indeed this is the case as will be shown below. This is stated
as Lemma 2.
LEMMA 2. Let  > 0 and  > 0; then
lim
t!1 jx(t)  x(t)j = 0
The elements of the historical tendencies may now be dened. k 
K=L is the capital-labour ratio and s  1  wLY is the share of income
received by the capitalists. Next consider the rate of prot. Since capi-
talistsshare of the income of the aggregate is , as in the justication
of (3),
rK = xf 0(x)et (15)
where r is the marginal product of capital. The rate of prot R is
dened as total capitalist income divided by the value of factors of
production owned by the capitalists:
R  Y   wL+
_PM
K + PM
:
Since capitalists hold both capital and land, the rate of return on both
of these assets, when calculated in terms of the good, must be the
same12:
r =
@Y
@M +
_P
P
: (16)
12 r is the own rate of return on capital in the sense that both the gain from a
unit of capital and the unit itself are measured in terms of the good. (16) can be
interpreted as saying that the own rate of return on capital must be equal to the
rate of return on land when both the gain and the stock are measured in terms of
the good. It should be noted that this rate of return is not the same as the own rate
of return on land, ( 1
P
) @Y
@M
:
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It is easily shown that (16) implies that R = r . Thus from this point
on r will be taken as the rate of prot. From (15) r = xf 0(x)et=K:
The main result can now be proved. As explained in the introduc-
tion, it is assumed that the world end at a terminal date te:The main
result states that as the terminal date approaches innity, the terminal
capital-labour ratio approaches innity, the terminal capitalist income
share approaches one and the terminal rate of prot approaches zero.
THEOREM 3. Let  > 0 and  > 0: Then k(te)!1; s(te)! 1; and
r(te)! 0 as te !1:
Proof. Let L(te) and K(te) be the values of K and L at t = te derived
from (3), (4) and the function x(t). Then k(te) = K(te)=L(te): From 3
and 15
r(te) =
w
1  
1
k(te)
: (17)
From (2) and (3)
s(te) =
c2(x(te))
  + 1
c2(x(te))  + 1
:
From (3) and( 4)
k(te) = c3 [c2 + (x(te))
]
+
 e te
where c3 = w (
1 
 c1c2)
  1
 . Thus, from Lemma 1,
k(te)! c3x(te)+e te as te !1:
Let d(te) be the distance between x(te) and x(te) that is
d(te)  x(te)  (a

et)1=
where d(te)! 0 as te !1 from Lemma 2. Then
k(te)! c3

(
a

)1=e


te + d(te)
+
e te
= c3

(
a

)1=e

(+)
te + d(te)e
  1
+
te
+
! c3(a

)
+
 e


te as te !1: (18)
Thus since  > 0 and since  > 0 implies  > 0; k(te) ! 1
as te ! 1: Thus r(te) ! 0 as te ! 1: Finally, since by Lemma 1
x(te)!1 as te !1,  > 0 means that s(te)! 1 as te !1: 
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A quick reading of the theorem might lead one to think that, for
example, the rate of prot will be close to zero only when the world is
about to end. But this is not the case. If te is large, the slope of the rate
of prot as a function of time approaches zero as t approaches te: Thus
the rate of prot will be close to a number close to zero long before t
is close to te For example the rate of prot could have fallen to a very
low level by 2100 even though this is long before the end of the world.
3. A Heuristic Description of the Result13
In this description land and the aggregate are always expressed in e¤ec-
tive units while labour and capital are in physical units. The rst step
is to understand why the capital-labour aggregate in e¤ective units, X,
grows faster than land, M , in the same units. It must do this in order
to keep the marginal product of labour constant because the aggregate
admits technical progress. This can be seen as follows: suppose the
rate of growth of the aggregate was less than or equal to that of land,bX  0  :
a. Y^  0 by constant returns to scale and, since there is a con-
stant savings ratio, bY = cK asymptotically so that bY = cK  0
asymptotically.
b. Since bX = cK+(1 )bL+; bL  0  1  : That is, since capital
is growing at least as fast as the aggregate, labour must grow more
slowly to compensate for the technical progress.
c. But in this case the marginal product of labour rises both because
the capital to labour ratio increases and the ratio of the aggregate to
land falls. Since this is impossible, the aggregate must grow faster than
land.
To put this in a nutshell: If the aggregate does not grow faster than
land, then capital will grow at least as fast as the aggregate, labour will
grow slower to compensate for the technical progress of the aggregate
and the impossible wage growth will occur.
The second step is to understand why this implies that capital must
grow faster than labour: Since  < 1, asymptotically, the slowest grow-
ing factor dominates so that bY = : Again asymptotically, because of
the constant savings ratio, cK = bY : Finally from the condition that the
wage is constant, bL =   bx which can be understood as follows: If x
was constant then the payment to the aggregate would grow at  and,
13 The arguments of this section are only approximate. It is frequently stated that
the rates of growth of the variables approach limits. This is convenient for an intuitive
discussion and may well be the case, but it has not been formally demonstrated. The
problem is that Lemma 2 does not imply that bx(t)! bx(t) as t!1:
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since labour receives a constant proportion of this, the labour supply
would have to grow at  to keep the wage xed. Since  < 1 the growth
of x will reduce the payment to the aggregate at an asymptotic rate
of bx so that the payment to labour grows at    bx and the labour
supply must grow at this rate to keep the wage constant. Thus it is
a combination of the relative growth of the aggregate,  < 1 and the
constant wage that forces capital to grow faster than labour.14 .
Finally, what forces drive the historical tendencies? First, the ag-
gregate grows faster than land because of technical progress in the
aggregate. Because of this, with  < 1, in order to keep the wage
constant labour must grow more slowly than capital. This establishes
that k !1 . Second, since both the share of capital in the aggregate
and the reward to labour are constant, the faster growth of capital
must be compensated for by a fall in its reward. This establishes that
r ! 0: (Alternatively, the rise in K=L with the marginal product of
labour xed forces the marginal product of capital to fall.) Finally, since
 < 1; the faster growth of the aggregate forces its share and that of
labour to zero. This establishes that s! 1:
With this detailed heuristic account, the reader may be in danger of
not seeing the forest through the trees. A simpler, less accurate expla-
nation is the following. Think in terms of a model with only capital and
land. Generally, when one adds factor augmenting technical progress
to a factor that can be accumulated, like capital, the result is explosive
growth in the sense that the rate of growth increases over time. But in
our simplied model, with elasticity less than one, this is counteracted
by the slower growth of land in e¢ ciency units. The result is a balance
between these two forces in which the growth of capital, in e¢ ciency
units, is not explosive but is more rapid than that of land with the
consequence of a continually falling rate of prot.
4. The Price of Land
As explained in the introduction it is assumed that the world ends
at a terminal date te: The path of the price of land is determined
from the di¤erential equation (16) that arises from the condition that
the rates of return on capital and land must be the same, together
with the condition that the price of land must be zero at te: If, in
equation (16) one substitutes the expressions for r and @Y=@M as t!
1 for the actual ones, then one has an equation which determines the
path of the asymptotic price. This section studies the behavior of the
14 With slightly more e¤ort one can see why x^ = = [1 + (1  )] : Put K^ = 
and then the above expression for L^ into (7).
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asymptotic price. This is only of interest if the path of the asymptotic
price approaches that of the actual price. This is presumably the case
but I have not proved it. From this point on the asymptotic price will
be written as P and will be referred to as the price of land.
The result is that, if the terminal date is far enough in the future, the
price of land rst rises and then, at a certain point, begins to fall and
continues to fall until it reaches zero at the terminal date. The intuition
is the following: Initially the marginal product of capital is high and
that of land low. As explained in the previous section, the marginal
product of a physical unit of capital falls; also, because  < 1 and
x ! 1, the marginal product of an e¢ ciency unit of land approaches
a constant and so that of a physical unit rises. Intially the marginal
product of a physical unit of capital is high and that of land low but
this reverses over time. Thus, in order that the rate of return on both
assets be the same, land must rst experience capital gains and then,
later, losses.15
The equation which determines the path of the (asymptotic) price
of land is got as follows. From (18) and (17), with t substituted for te,
r ! d1e t as t ! 1 where d1  (1 w c1c2)
1
 (a )

 and    : Dif-
ferentiating (2) with respect to M and using Lemma 1 give @Y=@M !
d2e
t as t!1 where d2 = c1. Substituting these expressions into (16)
gives16
_P = d1e
 tP   d2et; with P (te) = 0 (19)
Theorem 4 gives the result of this section.
THEOREM 4. Let P (t) be the solution to (19) . If te is su¢ ciently
large, then there exists 0 < t < te such that _P R 0 as t Q t
Proof. To analyze (19), rst let z = et; z goes from 1 to ze = ete as
t goes from 0 to te: (19) becomes
dP
dt
  d1

z 


 1P =  1

d2:
15 One can think of the fall of the rate of prot in terms of the denition of R and
_P . Since R = (1 + _PM=Y   wL=Y )=(K=Y + PM) and since wL=Y ! 0, K=Y !
a constant and P ! 0, it is the capital loss on land, _P < 0, that is responcible for
the falling rate of prot.
16 In footnote 12, when (16) was introduced, it was noted that the own rates
of return on capital and land, r and ( 1
P
)( @Y
@M
); were not the same. There is a
curious relation between these two rates as te becomes large. Let t ! te; then
r(t) approaches a number close to zero. But since @Y=@M does not approach zero
and 1=P approaches innity, the own rate of return on land approaches innity. To
put it paradoxically, just as capitalism is about to fall because the rate of prot is
approaching zero, the own rate of return on land approaches innity.
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The integrating factor is e
d1

z
  
 so that the solution is given by
Pe
d1

z
  
 =  d2

Z z
1
e
d1

y
  
 dy + C
where C is a constant determined by P (te) = 0: Let v = z 

 and
u = y 

 so that v = e t and v goes from 1 to ve = e te < 1 as t goes
from 0 to te. Note that ve ! 0 as te ! 1 and that dv=dt < 0: The
previous equation becomes
Pe
d1

v =  d2

Z 1
v
e
d1

uu 
+
 du+ C (20)
where the value of C is given by setting the RHS of (20) equal to zero
and v = ve; thus
C =
d2

Z 1
ve
e
d1

uu 
+
 du:
Since e
d1

u  1 on [ve; 1]Z 1
ve
e


uu 
+
 du 
Z 1
ve
u 
+
 du =  

(1  v 


e )
so that C !1 as te !1:
To prove the theorem, di¤erentiate (20) to get
dP
dv
e
d1

v =
d2

e
d1

vv 
+
   P d1 e d1 v  g(v):
Setting v = 1 in this equation and noting that, from (20), the value
of P at v = 1 approaches innity as te !1 shows that dP=dv < 0 at
v = 1 for te su¢ ciently large. Since
dg
dv
=   + 

d2

e
d1

vv 
+
 < 0;
as v falls from 1 to ve, dPdv is, at rst negative, then at v zero, and nally
becomes positive since P = 0 at v = ve: Dening t by v = e t and
remembering that dvdt < 0 gives the result. 
Let me attempt to justify the idea that the path of price of land is
determined by the terminal date of the world. This idea is forced on us
as a way to avoid having the price of land eventually become negative.
But it seems absurd that one estimates the date at which the sun will
have cooled su¢ ciently to make the earth uninhabitable and then solves
a di¤erential equation to nd out what the current price of land should
swp0000.tex; 21/09/2005; 14:26; p.17
18
           x      xMT x     xmT
e
e
x         T T1 T2 t
Figure 1. Illustration of lemmas 6 and 7
be. I want to argue that this is reasonable: Under the weak assumptions
of the model, as explained above, the marginal product of land in
physical units will rise and that of capital fall. It is completely plausible
that a similar pattern will occur in the real world. This can easily give
rise to the temporal pattern where the price of land rst increases and
then decreases, driven approximately by the di¤erential equation (19).
Now move into the far future, when the date of humanitys departure
has (hopefully) has become a factor which a¤ects peoplescalculations.
Capital, in one way or another, can be taken along but, it will be
supposed, the earth itself must be left behind. If it becomes apparent
that, given the current path, land will have a positive price at the last
moment, there will be a downward adjustment and visa versa. But the
result should be that, without specic calculations now, the price of
land will approach zero as humanity prepares to leave the earth.17.
17 My late wife grew up in a mansion on the shores of Sidney harbour which later
became the Canadian embassy. Her father bought it for a song just after a Japanese
pocket submarine had shelled Sydney from the waters of the same harbour.
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5. Proof of Lemma 2
This section provides the proof of Lemma 2. It does it only for the case
of     > 0: This will be called Lemma 7. This is the most di¢ cult
and also the most interesting case since it is the one in which the rate
of technical progress in land  can be unboundedly large. The proof
of the other case,      0; is set out in Petith (2002). Lemma 7
states that x(t), the solution to (9), approaches x(t), given by (14), as
t!1: The proof proceeds in two steps and can be read from gure 1.
Lemma 6 uses Chaplygins theorem to establish that x lies between two
bounding functions xmt and xMT : Then Lemma 7 shows that these
two bounding functions eventually enter an  tube that surrounds x,
thus x is asymptotically equivalent to x:
First Chaplygins theorem is stated:
THEOREM 5. 18 Let x(t) be the solution to the equation _x = g(x; t);
x(T ) = X and let xmt(t) and xMT (t) be two bounding functions with
xmT (T ) = xMT (T ) = X: If the di¤erential inequalities
_xmT (t)  g(xmT (t); t) < 0
_xMT (t)  g(xMT (t); t) > 0
hold for t > T , then
xmT (t) < x(t) < xMT (t)
for all t > T:
Next the bounding functions are constructed by taking the solutions
to modied forms of (12). First modify( 12) as
_x =
a
x 1
et +m
  

x =
a
x 1
et +
  m

x; x(T ) = X (21)
where m = m + (1  m): Then take xmT (t) as the solution to this
equation with  in (13) replaced by m: Next modify (12) as
_x =M(
a
x 1
et +
  

x) =
aM
x 1
et +
  M

x; x(T ) = X (22)
where aM =Ma and M = M + (1 M): Then take xMT (t) as the
solution to this equation with a and  in (13) replaced by aM and M .
Now Lemma 6 may be proved.
18 See Mikhlin and Smolitskiy (1967, pp. 9-12.) or Zwillinger (1989, pp. 388-391.).
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LEMMA 6. Let x(t) be the solution to (9), let  > 0; and  > 0 and
take    < 0: For any ~x there exists a T such that x(T ) > ~x and
xmT (t) < x(t) < xMT (t); t > T
where
xmT (t) = x(t; a; m; X(T ); T ); m = ~G(x(T ))= ~F (x(T ))
and
xMT (t) = x(t; aM ; M ; x(T ); T ); M = ~G(x(T )):
Proof. The properties of the bounding functions depend on those of ~F (x)
and ~G(x): It is clear that
~G(x)= ~F (x) > 1; (23)
and that there exists and x such that
~F 0(x) < 0; ~G0(x) < 0 and ( ~G(x)= ~F (x))0 < 0 for x > x (24)
Next a condition on the derivatives of xmT and xMT is given. For
the given ~x choose T so that x(T ) > ~x, so that x(T ) > x of (24) and
so that _x(T ) > 0: This is possible since, by Lemma 1 x(t) is unbounded
above. Since _x(T ) > 0, writing (9) in terms of ~F (x) and ~G(x) gives
a
x 1
et ~F (x) +
  

x ~G(x) = _x(T ) > 0; x = x(T ); (25)
by (25)

xmT (T ) =
a
x 1
et +
  

x
~G(x)
~F (x)
> 0; x = xmT (T )
and nally

xmT (t) > 0; t  T: (26)
The last inequality follows by di¤erentiating (13) with respect to time
to get

x(t) =
1

x
1

 1a

et
h
+ (   )C(:)e t
i
: (27)
Replacing  with m shows that

xmT is either positive (if ( )C(:) >
0) or increasing in t:
Also

xMT (T ) = ~G(x)(
a
x 1
et +
  

x)
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> ~G(x)(
~F (x)
~G(x)
a
x 1
et +
  

x) > 0; for x = xMT (T )
where the rst inequality follows from (23) and the second from (25);
and, as above, from (27)

xMT (t) > 0; t  T: (28)
Finally it is shown that the conditions of Chaplygins theorem are
satised.
xmT (T ) = x(T ) = xMT (T )
by construction.
xmT (t) > xmT (T ); xMT (t) > xMT (T ); t > T (29)
by (26) and (28).

xmT (t) =
a
x 1
et +m
  

x < (
a
x 1
et +
~G(x)
~F (x)
  

x) ~F (x)
=
a
x 1
et ~F (x) +
  

x ~G(x); for x = xmT (t); t > T
by (11), (23), (24), and (29).

xMT (t) =M(
a
x 1
et +
  

x) > (
~F (x)
~G(x)
a
x 1
et +
  

x) ~G(x)
=
a
x 1
et ~F (x) +
  

x ~G(x) for x = xMT (t); t > T
by (23), (24) and (29). This completes the proof. 
Finally Lemma 7 is proved for the case of    < 0:
LEMMA 7. Let x(t) be the solution to (9), let  > 0 and  > 0 and
take    < 0: Then
lim
t!1 jx(t)  x(t)j = 0
Proof. Choose  arbitrary but with  < 1;  < 4
( 

 1) : It must be shown
that there is a T such that
(1  )x(t) < x(t) < (1 + )x(t); t > T
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Choose ~x large enough so that , for the T given by Lemma 6,
~G(x)
~F (x)
< 1 +
=2
1  
; ~G(x) < 1 +
1


1+=2
=4   1
; for x  x(T ): (30)
Now apply Lemma 6. The proof is completed by showing that there
exists a T such that
(1  )x(t) < xmT (t); xMT (t) < (1 + )x(t); t > T:
Choose T1 > T so that
(1  =2) < 1  e mtC(a; m; x(T ); T ); t > T1:
(30), and the denitions of m and m imply
1
1 + =2
<
1
m+ (1 m)
=
1
m=
:
(1  ) < (1  ) < 1
1 + =2
(1  =2) < 1
m=
(1  =2);
(1  )a

et <
a
m
et(1  e mtC(a; m; x(T ); T ));
(1  )x(t) < xmT (t); for t > T1:
Choose T2 > T such that
1  e M tC(aM ; M ; x(T ); T ) < 1 + =4; for t > T2:
(30) and the denition of M imply
M
M + (1 M)
< 1 + =4:
This and the denitions of aM and M give
aM
M
<
a

(1 + =4):
aM
M
et(1  e M tC(aM ; M ; x(T ); T )) < a

et(1 + =4)2
<
a

et(1 + ) <
a

et(1 + ); t > T2
xMT (t) < (1 + )x(t); t > T2:
The proof is completed by taking T =Max(T1; T2): 
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